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Ever since the creation of the social sciences as a distinct orientation 
within the scientific community, the relation between these sciences 
- particularly sociology - and social change has been subject to contin-
uous debate. And it seems as though the discussion about the use of so-
ciological knowledge to help change the world has increased in scope and 
intensity. It has become almost impossible to keep up with the insatiable 
flow of articles and books on the policy-relevancy of sociology during 
the last ten years. The reasons are numerous. 
The general underlying attitude seems to be that sociology is not only 
applicable to the analysis of public policy-making, but should also be 
applied to decision-making in public affairs. 
At the same time, however, there is a growing awareness that applied 
studies seldom result in policy-recommendations, or in recommendations 
that are simply not used by the public policy-making bodies, thus 
leading to an atmosphere of reproach, disappointment and estrangement. 
Most discussions about this state of affairs deal with the shortcomings 
of sociology and public policy-making relations, instead of coming to 
grips with the fundamental issues at stake. One of the main problems is 
the degree of governability of societal processes as Van Lier (1980:9) 
recently put it. Such a study could be called the sociology of inter-
vention and should have a wider scope than is usual in policy sciences. 
It should look at problems concerning the limits of steermanship of the 
social sciences, especially in a period of widely-felt recognition of 
the trouble that governments run into. It is this problem that raises 
the question of the quest for control (Van Gunsteren, 1976). 
However, most discussions about the role of sociology in policy-making 
centre around topics such as: 
the conditions under which policy-makers normally operate 
the type of research method or the selection of theoretical orien-
tation by the social researcher (for instance, the debate about 
knowledge for understanding versus knowledge for action) 
the difference in culture, language and frame of reference between 
social researchers and policy-makers 
deficiencies in the state of art in sociology (to the effect that 
policy-makers do not attach much prestige and authority to socio-
logical knowledge, in contrast to economic analyses for instance) 
the lack of an adequate organizational structure as a meeting place 
of social sciences and policy. 
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It is to be hoped that apart from general reflections more emperical 
research in these fields will be conducted. 
The object of this essay, however, is to inquire into the position as 
such of sociological knowledge, in the decision-making process that 
policy-making essentially is. My suggestion is that the widely accepted 
misconception about the process of transformation of applied research 
into policy-action is largely to blame for the disappointing record of 
the utilization of social sciences in policy-making. I hope to be able 
to demonstrate that, in general, sociologists tend to overestimate the 
impact of scientific knowledge in shaping public policy and to under-
estimate the role of conscious or unconscious ignorance and of politics 
in the very same transformation process of knowledge into action. 
My analysis will focus on the primordial question of delineating recep-
tiveness of public policy for social sciences, i.e. sociological know-
ledge. These reflections will be restricted to the immediate interaction 
between both units, and will leave aside the more general and diffuse 
utilization of sociological research findings that in a more indirect 
way influence strategic decision-makers. In an open, pluralistic society, 
these indirect lines of communication between the sources of new know-
ledge and the centres of policy-making are highly significant. 
Decision-making is mainly studied at the level of the individual actor 
or small group. Therefore, to get some basic idea, my analysis begins 
with individual decision-making. This is not to suggest that there is 
a similarity between individual and societal actors (Etzioni, 1968), 
but is meant to open the eyes to the intricacies of the application of 
knowledge and non-knowledge in the decision-making process. After re-
viewing some of the basic approaches in the literature on decision-
making strategies in public policies, we present our main argument about 
the primacy of politics in the transformation process of sociological 
knowledge into action. 
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2 HUMAN BEINGS AS DECISION-MAKERS 
Human beings as decision-makers are information-utilizers. A basic ques-
tion one must ask is: How does an individual use the information at his 
disposal in order to arrive at "adequate" decisions, especially deci-
sions that entail serious consequences? Are there certain ways of arri-
ving at the best solutions? 
Probably, most of the work done by social scientists in this field 
consists of developing normative, prescriptive models that start with 
the assumption of the rationality of a person's decisions and then 
developing procedures according to which researchers think rational 
persons should make their decisions. A very fine example of such an ap-
proach is to be found in Janis and Mann (1977:11) who mention seven 
"ideal" procedural criteria for attaining the decision maker's ob-
jectives: 
The decision maker, to the best of his ability and within his in-
formation-processing capabilities 
1. thoroughly canvasses a wide range of alternative courses of 
action; 
2. surveys the full range of objectives to be fulfilled and the 
values implicated by the choice; 
3. carefully weighs whatever he knows about the costs and risks 
of negative consequences, as well as the positive consequences, 
that could flow from each alternative; 
4. intensively searches for new information relevant to further 
evaluation of the alternatives; 
5. correctly assimilates and takes account of any new information 
or expert judgment to which he is exposed, even when the in-
formation or judgment does not support the course of action he 
initially prefers; 
6. re-examines the positive and negative consequences of all 
known alternatives, including those originally regarded as 
unacceptable, before making a final choice; 
7. makes detailed provisions for implementing or executing the 
chosen course of action, with special attention to contingency 
plans that might be required if varous known risks were to 
materialize. 
Janis and Mann's working assumption is "that failure to meet any of these 
seven criteria when a person is making a fundamental decision constitutes 
a defect in the decision-making process" (p. 11). Deviations of this mod-
el of "vigilant information processes" are called miscalculations or de-
fective decision-making, although the authors state that they see man 
not as a cold fish but as a warm-blooded mammal, not as a rational cal-
culator always wanting to work out the best solution but as a reluctant 
decision-maker. 
The next paragraphs draw heavily - and I have to admit rather freely 
on Wagenaar (1977). 
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More and more the conviction has gained ground that this rational ap-
proach to human decision-making is based on a normative intellectual 
model that is not without heuristic value, but that has scarcely any-
thing to say about the real process of decision-making. An increasing 
flow of empirical research inquiring what people actually do when they 
make decisions rather than using the yardstick of rationalty, have come 
to the conclusion that individuals basically have to act within a con-
text of limitations. 
To begin with, human beings are only able to absorb limited amounts of 
information simultaneously. The rational decision-maker also has an 
impossible task to cope with information overload. But apart from these 
sheer limitations of a physical and psychological nature, there are 
other limitations that are at the core of decision and information as 
such. To mention only two aspects of it: 
The limited time horizon in decision-making. The consequences of a de-
cision and the corresponding activities are incalculable, particularly 
on a long-term basis. The interconnections between the infinite number 
of variables are too complicated to be adequately interpreted beforehand. 
That is to say, any decision is, to a considerable extent, a shot in 
the dark. 
Then there is the cognitive complexity involved in any essential decision. 
The many aspects of a decision are so intricate in terms of costs and 
benefits, of long-term and short-term effects, in measurable and immea-
surable consequences, in adequacy and inadequacy of information that is 
essentially impossible to gather all the various facets under one denom-
inator. The selection of alternatives is essentially hampered by the 
lack of objective standards for appraising different courses of action 
on a comparative basis. 
These are some reasons why rationality is limited by the very nature of 
decision-making. For the same reason some people say that the making 
of a decision is more of an art than a pure calculation. 
This short introduction into limited rationality already raises the ques-
tion: If it is not pure rationality that guides human decision-makers' 
behaviour, what then are individuals actually doing when they make deci-
sions? 
In order to solve the problem of coping with the misery of having to 
make critical decisions, people have a wide range of patterns, procedures 
and methods at their disposal that are daily applied depending on the 
situational context. By way of illustration, I will indicate some of 
these patterns that people consciously or - as a rule - unconsciously 
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use to come to terms with decisional conflicts, or "tricks" as Wagenaar 
(1977) calls them in his fascinating work that deals with many more pat-
terns of decision-making behaviour than can be mentioned here. 
"Satisficing", a concept originally introduced by H.A. Simon, is our first 
illustration. According to the model of rational behaviour, selecting a 
course of action with the highest pay-off requires the estimation of the 
comparative value of every alternative in terms of expected costs and 
benefits. In the foregoing we have already seen the insuperable burden 
of information overload and entanglement of the numerous variables in-
volved in decisional dilemmas. Simon has pointed out that people do not 
generally follow an optimizing or maximizing approach, but try to reach 
a satisfactory, suboptimizing solution; one which, consequently, provides 
a relatively satisfactory realization of the actor's values. In other 
words, he looks for a course of action that he considers "good enough". 
This satisficing strategy, according to Simon, fits the limited in-
formation-processing capabilities of human beings. It is characterized 
by the consideration of only a limited number of objectives and of alter-
native routes to achieve these objectives, the testing of the alternatives 
as it comes to the actor's attention, and a rough estimation of minimal 
cost-benefit ratios. 
A second "trick" to cope with decisional dilemmas with an overload of 
conflicting information, is rationalization. In a lot of cases, a satis-
ficing decision is the one that can be best defended (Wagenaar, 1977: 
44-49). People often make decisions on account of their subjective es-
timation of the acceptability by others of the arguments involved. This 
pattern is not necessarily at the cost of scientific or rational reaso-
ning. In fact, almost any decision can - if needed - be supported by 
drawing on different facts, but more generally by giving different inter-
pretations as a result of different theories and perspectives. 
This tendency towards choices on the basis of tenability of arguments 
can take place before of after the actual decision, or both. It poses 
no problem to an actor to find in all cases justifications for the 
adequacy of that particular decision (which does not exclude otherwise 
rational calculations before the decision). Under the rational model, in 
order to evaluate the outcome of a decision one would need to take into 
consideration all the effects of all the consequences. In practice, a 
decision-maker gives subjective ratings, that are to a great extent so-
cially induced. A famous example illustrates this principle. Ehrlich 
(quoted in Wagenaar, 1977) has shown that most automobile advertisements 
are read by people who have just bought a new car, and not by those who 
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are planning to buy a new one. The need for information seems to be 
greater after the acquisition than before. 
But the striving towards justification afterwards affects a person's 
deliberations even before taking the decision. If an individual has no 
dependable way of objectively assessing the success of a course of action 
after the decision, how can we expect him to test the implications of a 
specific course of action before he makes it? One way to cope with this 
dilemma is to take into account beforehand the various paths of justi-
fiability of his decision vis à vis other people, even before anybody 
asks for it. He anticipates and specifies the reactions of others on 
his decision, even when the evaluators are completely imagined. "Truth" 
does not always result in the best decision or the best solution. It 
would be all too easy to classify this pattern of social behaviour under 
the heading of weighing up all known alternatives in terms of costs and 
risks of negative consequences. In this way, every decision can be rea-
soned as being a rational one. 
A final illustration of the way people cope with the dilemma of making a 
vital decision is to avoid making it by procrastinating or by inventing 
additional reasons for ignoring the worrisome situation. Janis and Mann 
(1977) call this reluctant behaviour "defensive avoidance". 
Looking back at our argument so far, it is clear that my position is to 
start from descriptive and explanatory variables in decision-making 
rather than to start from reducing actors to hunters of alternatives 
within the means-end calculus. For sociologists, one problem is the 
claim of universalism of the different decision-making strategies, in-
dependent of any socio-political configuration. One of the main questions 
is under which socio-political conditions the one or other strategy is 
likely to prevail, independent of the personal aptitude of the individ-
ual. 
A second consideration concerns the emphasis on knowledge and information 
as the vital variables in the understanding of the decision-making pro-
cess. However, it is not only knowledge that guides human behaviour, 
but also the lack of knowledge (Kruithof, 1977). I would say that plain 
ignorance is as much a determining factor in human decision-making as 
is information. Reality forces us to recognize that ignorance is omni-
present in the daily affairs of any human being, and apparently so in 
our modern differentiated society. 
The significance of ignorance lies in its relevancy for the social con-
struction of reality by individuals and groups. Ignorance affects the 
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individual's interpretation of his situation, he is a victim of the exis-
tence of ignorance as an essential component of social life. But to a 
certain extent people are also aware of the existence of ignorance, in-
cluding their own, which they use to organize and control their social 
environment and the social life of their fellow-men. 
Although in daily practice knowledge and ignorance are intensively inter-
woven, individuals and groups generally tend to present themselves as 
people who know. 
The suggestion I want to make here is that ignorance is an essential 
variable in human decision behaviour. To study individual actors from 
the point of view of their ignorance processing capacity as well as 
their ignorance controlling capacity may be as valuable as the traditi-
onal approaches through information processing. I refer here to the in-
teresting, explorative analysis of ignorance and social behaviour by 
Kruithof (1977), one of the few studies in this field. 
My argument so far has been that the role of knowledge in the social 
behaviour of individual actors is limited, as evidenced by an overwhelming 
number of experimental findings. Saying this means that decision-makers 
are not only in need of a strategy of utilization of knowledge, but of 
a strategy of utilization of ignorance as well. 
Sociologists tend to underestimate the role of ignorance in human behav-
iour and in human relations, which might be a reflection of the intel-
lectual's position in society. Intellectuals are preoccupied with know-
ledge. Moreover, they are led as a rule by the idea that mankind moves 
towards progress by the diffusion of scientific knowledge (Van Lier, 
2 1980:4) . This attitude is well exemplified by a recent statement made 
by one of the leading Dutch sociologists : "Modernization as an indis-
pensable element of the development process is according to a generally 
It goes without saying that the relationship between social sciences 
and policy-making will basically depend on a much more encompassing 
attitude about the belief in progress. Several decades ago Van Lier 
(1956:10) stated that to him most intellectuals had already lost 
their certainty of belief in progress but continued to behave as 
if they still believed in the old conception. Their old belief is 
replaced by an attitude of hope, sometimes against their better 
judgement. Without an element of hope, says Van Lier, any possibil-
ity of improving society by planned intervention would be absurd. 
How this tendency will develop, is uncertain. Since the fifties 
criticism with regard to the social function of science has vastly 
increased, including attacks on science as such as an asocial under-
taking (Boers, 1980). Also, the question arises whether the masses 
have changed their belief or acceptance of progress during the last 
decades, which has affected societal consensus about the credibil-
ity of science. 
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accepted definition the systematic application of ever expanding scien-
3 
tific knowledge to all realms of societal life" (Breman, 1980) . In 
spite of the fact that nowadays science is under heavy attack with 
respect to its objectivity as well as to its "blessings" for society 
(see, for instance, Boers, 1980), social scientists continue to attach 
great value to science as a supplier of knowledge to solve societal 
problems in a rational way, be it by "traditional" types of social re-
search or by renewed, fashionable methods like action-research. In my 
opinion, it would be worthwhile to complement and counterbalance the 
social scientists' perspective on knowledge, by a sociology of ignorance. 
J.C. Breman at the seminar on Research in the social sciences and 
policies for development cooperation. The Hague, november 1980. 
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3 INTERLUDE 
Undoubtedly, there is a certain analogy between the decision-making 
process of individuals (or small groups) and of societal actors, e.g. 
policy-makers. The differences, however, may be equally great, dependent 
as decision-makers are on the situational context. According to Etzioni 
(1968:252) "macro-decision-makers" differ from individual ones as fol-
lows: They are internally more differentiated, they can make use of 
larger amounts of knowledge and more sophisticated decision-making tech-
nology, and their process of decision-making is more institutionalized 
and organized. This differing social context adds fundamentally to the 
4 complexity of public policy-making, which can be ignored all too easily . 
Moreover, as Etzioni suggests in a provoking passage (1968: 139), "to a 
greater extent than individuals, societal actors can function for long 
periods of time with little empirically valid social knowledge". The 
greater capacity, real or perceived, to alter their environments is one 
of the reasons why the reality-testing of public decision-makers is 
particularly limited. 
Not all research is fully aware of the significance of this differ-
ence. For instance, in "Decision-making" (1977) Janis and Mann pre-
sent interchangeable studies of psychological processes in decision-
making that refer to individuals as well to societal actors. 
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4 SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE NOTION OF POLICY 
In the meantime, mutual declarations of "love" between policy-makers and 
the academic world are not exceptional. At first sight a close relation-
ship between these two parties would seem to be all but promising: govern-
ments want to make policies that are based on scientific knowledge as 
much as possible, and the social sciences want to serve society. 
However, reality is different and harder. Many authors studying this re-
lationship ascertain that sociological research has so far not contrib-
uted very much to the making of public policies. Undoubtedly there is an 
element of fashion, of "bon ton", in this discussion. Much application 
of sociology is probably hidden away in the dark, because it is not 
being interpreted as having been applied for one reason or another, be-
cause the effect is of an indirect nature, or because policy-makers 
simply apply sociological knowledge without even knowing, let alone 
acknowledging that they were applying it, or because application is 
piecemeal or intermittent. Complaining about the lack of policy rele-
vancy appears to be part of the state of the arts in sociology. 
Whatever the element of fashion in the discussion, there is the unmis-
takable fact that sociological research findings are not made much use 
of in government agencies. And when it comes to real business, the mutual 
admiration diminishes and gives way to the harsh realities of daily life. 
A striking example was given by a spokesman of the Dutch Directorate-
General for International Cooperation at a seminar on social science 
research and policy-making in development cooperation who said: "Research 
is of only a marginal account in our policy-making" and "researchers 
ought not to overrate their own role in policy-making". 
Disillusion or realism? 
Many factors related to this discussion and illustrated in the intro-
duction of this essay do not, in my opinion, get to the heart of the 
matter. The notion of what policy-making is or ought to be is essential 
for an adequate understanding of the potential and actual role of social 
science knowledge in public policies which unevitably raises the question 
of the place of politics in policy. 
4.1 What is public policy-making? 
Generally, and unfortunately, sociologists in their capacity as re-
searchers are not familiar with policy-making structures and processes. 
W.M. Floor at the same seminar as mentioned under 3. 
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They have no personal or intimate knowledge of the daily affairs of 
policy-makers, nor do they sufficiently appreciate the exacting task of 
being a policy-maker, whom they often consider, not without contempt, as 
opportunistic shortsighted actors. But lack of familiarity is not likely 
to be the major variable in explaining the unhappy relationship between 
social science and public policy. The more important point is what the 
prevailing notion is about the essence of policy-making. Many a 
sociologist advocates, often unwittingly, a method of making policy. 
That is, as Scott & Shore (1980:63) state, when they speak of using so-
ciology in policy-making to enlighten, to provide ideas and information, 
or to evaluate or further understanding of policy and so on, they pre-
suppose the existence of a method for conducting public affairs, which 
grant these functions to sociology. 
The most common idea of sociologists about the process of public deci-
sion-making is probably the one concerning the rational method. They 
presuppose a commitment to rationality and scientific procedures. This 
approach entails a specification of objectives and values as a prere-
quisite for empirical analyses of policy alternatives. Policy is deter-
mined by an analysis of means and ends whereby all relevant alternatives 
are exhaustively surveyed in a comprehensive way, based on scientific 
information and expertise. 
The approach is best illustrated by the procedure one presumably has to 
follow if he is willing to implement a programme rationally, as stated 
by Scott & Shore (1980:70). 
Initially, he would want (1) to determine what the problem is. 
Anticipating the necessity for using methods and techniques of 
social science research in this and other facets of the policy-
making process, it would be necessary (2) to define the problem 
clearly and precisely. The next step would be (3) to clarify the 
goals, values and objectives of the social policies to be developed 
to deal with this problem. 
One would want (4) to organize these in a hierarchical fashion 
reflecting prevailing notions about how to attack the problem and 
how to arrive at overall priorities. Next, the policy analyst would 
(5) list all the possible ways of achieving these goals and (6) 
make an inventory of the full range of consequences that might 
reasonably be expected to follow from each of the possible alter-
natives he has conceived. These, in turn, would be (7) ranked along 
a continuum from the most to the least preferred outcomes (8). 
Estimates would then be made of financial and manpower resources 
likely to be available to accomplish the objectives sought, and 
some determination would be made of the probable (9) costs asso-
ciated with each of the possible courses of action. A (10) pro-
cedure would then be instituted to bring all this information 
together at the time and place that a decision must be made, so 
that the policy-maker would be in a position to compare the costs 
and probable consequences of each proposed policy with the overall 
goals and to select the most realistic and most effective alter-
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native leading to the preferred set of consequences. 
Once agreement was reached, the policy-maker would then draw 
further on the sociologist's skills for such aids as supplying 
information necessary for the (11) implementation of policy and 
(12) evaluating a policy's success. Such information, particularly 
that gained through evaluation research, would then (13) be fed 
back into the policy process so that action could be taken to 
correct unanticipated problems and to improve overall effec-
tiveness . 
The idea behind this procedure is that it will lead to situations that 
maximize the positive and minimize the negative. 
However, empirical evidence has shown that this approach has little 
reality value and simply cannot be implemented. We refer to the analogy 
about the position of information and scientific knowledge as only very 
adequate explanations of individual behaviour. There is no denying that 
the approach of the rational method may have unquestionable heuristic 
value, but pushing the reduction too far from the context has rendered 
it ahistorical, asociological and apolitical. For partly similar criti-
cism on the phenomenon of modern planning in the developing countries 
see Caiden & Wildavsky (1974) and Van Dusseldorp (1975). 
For a more realistic approach that considers the dependency of the 
relationships with the environment as a major variable, one has to turn 
to the incremental conception developed by Lindblom and his associates. 
This "art of muddling through" is viewed as being commonly followed. 
The strategy of "incrementalism" which implies that policy-makers do 
not follow a comprehensive procedure to arrive at decisions, contains 
a number of elements that are claimed to be more relevant for under-
standing what is actually taking place in policy bodies. Basically only 
marginal decisions are made which only differ to a limited degree from 
existing policies. Decision-makers investigate only a limited number of 
alternatives that consider only a limited number of impacts. Only a 
few means are considered and objectives are adjusted to the available 
means, rather than adjusting means to goals. Problems are weighed in a 
neverending series of formulation and reformulation; there is no one 
decision and no final problem solving. Analysis and evaluation are 
geared to alleviate concrete problematic situations rather than to ar-
rive at hitherto unrealized goals. Consensus about all possible values 
is not actively pursued and often develops only after a decision is 
made; analysis and evaluations are undertaken by all groups concerned 
which means that the strategy of incrementalism is essentially a dis-
jointed process. 
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Among critics of government policies this often evokes images of oppor-
tunism and aimlessness. However, these are exactly the characteristics 
of incrementalist policies that are actually followed in an effective 
and workable way in pluralistic societies. 
Etzioni (1968) looked for an alternative model that would challenge both 
rationalism and incrementalism and which is supposed to have a greater 
descriptive, analytical as well as normative value. In order to avoid 
the pitfalls of utopianism of the rationalistic model and the conserva-
tism of the incrementalistic approach, he designed a "mixed scanning" 
strategy that is presented as a realistic as well as a transforming 
model. The essential thesis in Etzioni's approach is that decision-makers 
differentiate fundamental decisions from bit decisions. When the incre-
mentalists say that an actor chooses between drastic decisions and bit 
decisions in favour of the last ones, Etzioni suggests that 
a) most incremental decisions specify or anticipate fundamental deci-
sions and 
b) the cumulative value of the incrementalist decision is greatly af-
fected by the underlying fundamental decisions (Etzioni, 1968:289). 
For this strategy a programme of instructions is presented (p. 286-288), 
which will not be specified here. 
It is not my intention to discuss the respective merits of the ratio-
nalistic, the incrementalistic or the mixed scanning approach. It re-
mains an open question whether systematic, empirical evidence is in 
support of either one or the other of these strategies, while recog-
nizing the extreme difficulties of thoroughly evaluating and assessing 
decision-making processes. The dominant sociological question is, under 
which socio-political conditions taking into account the decision-
maker's societal capacities, may one expect the prevalence or the 
greater effectivenesse of the one above the other? 
Our concern at the moment is: What does the notion of policy mean for 
the position of scientific knowledge in policy-making? 
In the rational decision-making approach to public policy, a very cen-
tral role is attributed to dependence on scientific information for 
arriving at rational public decisions. Lack of success in the realm 
of public policy is primarily relegated to a lack of development or 
utilization of theories and findings of modern science, including the 
social sciences. Many a sociologist considers this approach as the 
appropriate principle, if there is to be room for sociology in public 
affairs. Many sociologists explicitly or implicitly advocate the ratio-
nal model, because it provides the best procedures of making use of 
sociological knowledge. 
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The incrementalistic approach basically limits the role of social scien-
tists to a very great extent. The reason being that it is characterized 
by an endless series of comparisons with the existing situations which 
hinder the utilization of scientific knowledge other than the immediately 
instrumental, and is even active in eliminating or bypassing available 
scientific information. Generally, the "muddling through" strategy is 
denounced by sociologists by saying that it leads to irrational and 
ad-hoc public policies that create more problems than they solve. 
Neither does it provide adequate clues to the application of socio-
logical knowledge, nor does it link up with the scientific belief of 
rational theory-formation and fact-finding in social research as such. 
Etzioni's mixed scanning strategy follows an intermediate position. Al-
though this eminent social scientist in his major work "The Active So-
ciety" does not spell out the specific role of social science knowledge, 
one can safely say that he attaches substantial value to fundamental 
criticism and challenge by societal subunits that are relatively immune 
from societal pressure. Their task is to review the "community-of-assump-
tions" and challenge them when they are in danger of becoming detached 
from reality. In this context, Etzioni shows a particular concern for 
the continually growing inequality of knowledge within modern societies 
and between societies. 
It is to be expected that most sociologists, when becoming acquainted 
with public policies, will find themselves in situations that very much 
resemble the analysis put forward by Lindblom et al. Etzioni who main-
tains that the number and role of fundamental decisions are greater than 
incrementalists believe, also eagerly admits that incremental decisions 
are more common. And even: "Democracies must accept a relative degree 
of incrementalism .... because of their greater need to gain support for 
new decisions from many and conflicting sub-societies, a need which re-
duces their capacity to follow a long-run plan" (Etzioni, 1968:294). 
There is no logic in expecting that there is such a thing as an immediate 
link between scientific knowledge and its application in actual policy-
making, moreover, it is not very likely that there ever will be. 
In the following paragraph we will elaborate on the role of social science 
knowledge in an incremental decision-making situation, the most common 
context experienced by sociologists as we have suggested. Our focus will 
be the essential role of politics in public decison-making. 
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4.2 Knowledge and policy: the primacy of politics 
If it is not scientific knowledge or information that gives the clue to 
the making of a public decision, then how will it be made? Irrationally, 
at random? 
In order to get as concrete an exposition of our argument as possible, we 
borrow a very fine example from Scott & Shore (1980:136), where the first 
author analyses in detail some of his personal experiences of public 
policy-relevant research on the subject of blindness in the U.S.A. In 
particular we will refer to the author's struggle concerning the defini-
tion of the problem's definition. As we have seen in a rationalistic 
approach it is a prerequisite that a clear definition of the problem 
is formulated. However, most of the time this is not what actually hap-
pens . The situations that confront public policy-makers are more often 
than not multiple, conflicting, and inherently indistinct. Transforming 
the interpretation of these ambiguous situations into clear problem for-
mulations, is not purely a technical activity. Nevertheless, decisions 
are made. 
In this context it is worthwhile quoting Scott's own words at length, 
because his analysis of applied social research is exceptionally accu-
rate for an account of applied social research. Another reason for this 
long quotation is that, at first sight, the problem of blindness seems 
to be quite simple and should not present insurmountable difficulties 
for making acceptable and workable policy solutions. 
This part of the study is deliberately limited to the process of 
generation of policies. There is no immediate link between genera-
tion and implementation, since it poses questions about the nature 
of regulations, the obedience of organizations and individuals, 
the handling of authority and resources (vide Van Gunsteren, 1976). 
It is my estimation that the role of scientific knowledge in the 
interval from generation to implementation is as vulnerable as in 
the phase of policy formulation. 
Therefore, the notion of "applied sociology" as if instant relevance 
would be derived from it for policy implementation is to be contended. 
The term policy-relevant research or application-oriented knowledge 
would be more appropriate. Using the term applied sociology might 
raise false expectations of getting concrete and workable direct-
ives from the social sciences. 
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Several years ago, Scott was asked to do a study on blindness and ser-
vices for the blind in American society. The author continues: 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effectiveness of 
services for the blind in the United States with the objective of 
making recommendations for changing the system of delivery of ser-
vices for the blind and for reallocating resources to the different 
types of service programs. A major difficulty encountered in trying 
to meet this mandate was to determine what "the problem" of blind-
ness is. The author soon learned that while severe visual impairment 
is a condition that affects a million or more citizens in our country 
today and that most agree that lack of sight is a problem, the term 
"blindness" itself gives no indication of what this problem is. Is 
the condition of blindness a matter of physical disability or of 
social stigma? Is it a health problem or a problem of poverty? In 
view of the fact that nearly two-thirds of all people classed as 
blind are 65 years of age or older, is blindness a problem of 
visual loss or merely a facet of the normal aging process? Is it a 
physical problem involving an inability to relate to the distant 
environment directly? Is it a psychological problem of personality, 
or is it a sociological problem of interpersonal interaction be-
tween those who cannot see and those who can? One obvious answer is 
that it is all of these things and more, but this response does not 
suffice for the purpose of evaluating the adequacy of existing pro-
grams and recommending new ones. To approach the situation from a 
planning point of view it is necessary to know clearly, plainly and 
in advance what "the problem" is; yet, this is not something that 
is inherent in the situation or condition as such. 
Without any doubt, the problem is all of these things simultaneously. 
Most situations simply lack sufficient clarity of definition. Sociolo-
gical input cannot "solve" this phenomenon of multiplicity of inter-
pretation concerning such problematic situations. 
An equally false illusion, fairly common amongst problem-oriented re-
searchers, is the expectation of a solution from comprehensive, inter-
disciplinary research. An illusion because such a manoeuvre merely 
pushes the problem away to a new forum that has the same handicap. The 
interdisciplinary approach is known to be plagued by the very same pro-
blem for which it is supposed to be designed: finding a common ground 
for problem-definition (Lekanne dit Deprez, 1976). Even if interdisci-
plinary research manages to find scientific entries to promising inter-
linkages - which is seldom the cause -, it remains fundamentally un-
suited and incapable of transforming the ambiguities of public policy 
dilemmas into neatly delineated scientific networks and vice versa. 
Endeavours to attack policy problems with an interdisciplinary approach 
will certainly make for clarification of the several dimensions to be 
theoretically tackled in a problem situation. This might prove to be 
a precious advantage, but the same act may increase awareness of the 
distance between scientific activity and policy practice. 
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From the start, the scientific method of public decision-making is 
severely handicapped by the inherent lack of clarity on what the problem 
in question is. 
Of course, decision-making will proceed, but not on the basis of defining 
the problem from scientific perspectives only. 
Suppose that the nature of the problem is agreed upon - which in the 
incrementalistic view of policy, is not an unconditional prerequisite 
for a decision-making procedure - then the next stage is to arrive at an 
operationalisation of the definition that is efficient and administra-
tively workable. Without such a specification, no socio-economic cal-
culations or narrowly defined research can be done that will consider 
the implications of the several alternatives. And as with the definition 
of the problem, also in this "stage" in the decision-making process 
there is no neat, simple way of logically discovering what is the best 
solution of optimalisation. It is true that interdisciplinary research 
may incorporate different aspects of a problem (sociological, economic, 
psychological, etc.), it can never represent the different socio-
political interests involved. 
Scott & Shore (1980:138-140), in a very precise way, illustrate this 
phenomenon with the already mentioned study of blindness. 
Many years ago it was decided that because blind people must pur-
chase special services and have unusual expenses, some form of 
pension for the blind was required. In order to make preliminary 
decisions about the costs and administration of such a system, or 
to consider the possible alternatives, an estimate of the number of 
potential candidates was necessary, yet, no accurate estimate could 
be developed until clear criteria were established to decide whether 
or not a person was "blind". Thus, rationality dictated that there 
must be an explicit, precise definition of this term. 
The problem in constructing a workable administrative definition of 
blindness was the decision as to whose point of view to adopt; 
there was no single definition that was "the most accurate" or "the 
best" one to accept. The standard of cost suggested one kind of 
definition; the standard of adequacy of services a second; the 
standard of practical administration a third, and the standard of 
personal well-being of recipients of services a fourth. Moreover, 
what was a rational definition from any one of these points of view 
- say that of cost - often appeared to be irrational from some or 
all of the other points of view involved. 
The first definition of blindness that was considered was strictly 
in accordance with the dictionary meaning of that term, i.e. the 
total and complete inability to see. But at least two problems 
would have arisen if this definition had been adopted. First, it 
would have excluded from eligibility for service a substantial 
number of people who are severely visually impaired but who 
nevertheless possess some small amount of vision (...). 
The second problem was brought about by the fact that total blind-
ness is a rare event in the American population; by this definition 
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the population eligible for blindness services would probably not 
have exceeded 50.000 people. Therefore, it would have been prohib-
itively expensive to develop an entire national system of services 
for such a small population (...). 
Thus, the question arose as to where along the continuum of sight 
the line should be drawn. Administrative considerations dictated 
that the line must be drawn in such a way as to ensure that the 
procedures for determining if someone fell within the definition 
would be simple to administer. Cost and administrative consider-
ations dictated that it be drawn in such a manner as to produce a 
population in need that would be large enough to justify creating a 
national system of services, but not so large as to strain severely 
the government's social service budget. Social service consider-
ations dictated a line that would include all persons functionally 
restricted because of visual loss. Although the interests were 
rational, they were sometimes in conflict. 
Once the decision was made to draw a line that defined blindness, 
a further difficulty developed (...). In the population of people 
regarded as "blind" by the adopted legal definition, a majority 
possess a considerable amount of usable vision and experience 
problems vastly different and often less complex than the problems 
of those who cannot see at all (...). The dividing line between 
the sighted and the blind was made largely for economic and adminis-
trative reasons: it was believed that this definition would guaran-
tee a population of people large enough to justify federal invest-
ment in developing a national system of services. Yet, ever since 
its adoption, at national conventions of workers for the blind, in 
professional journals dealing with blindness and among the growing 
number of blind liberation groups, there have been recurrent dis-
cussions about the absurdity of this definition from a social and 
psychological point of view. 
This example of the study on blindness shows very clearly that a problem, 
neither in its definition nor in its operationalisation, is not given, 
but has to be constructed. Behind any definition of a societal problem 
is always the question of who is going to be served by this selection 
or combinations of selections of the many interpretations of a problem 
and who are not. The safe and workable scientific method that can logi-
cally offer solutions and ready-made alternatives, does not exist. 
Nevertheless, decisions are made in public policy bodies, with or with-
out social science expertise, and the question arises as to how policy 
decisions are arrived at if it is not scientific inputs that give ulti-
mate clues to the solution of a decisional conflict. 
What is decided and who is doing the deciding? 
For an answer, we have to start by admitting that in decisional dilemmas 
of importance the freedom of policy alternatives is greatly restricted. 
Making a policy is not just scanning a series of open-ended alternative 
courses of action. The decisional situation is embedded in a structural 
context that shapes the realistic possibilities of the several paths that 
can be followed. But first and foremost, there is no societal, nor intra-
policy consensus about the ultimate and short-term objectives, which 
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denies the possibility of one problem-defining perspective or one problem-
solving operationalisation. 
If there is no superior choice that can be defined by logical standards, 
what then is an effective choice, or in the words of Simon a decision 
that is "satisficing"? 
The answer to this question has already been given in the example about 
blindness as a social policy problem: "satisficing" solutions come about 
by the interactions of groups and individuals involved in and affected 
by certain policy areas, including the governmental policy-making bodies 
themselves within their intra-organizational setting. It is they who 
deliver the multiple inputs of definitions. And since it is exceptional 
to find these different definitions corresponding with each other, con-
sensus about what the situation is and about the course to be taken 
springs from the usual political mechanisms: the confrontation of power-
ful and less powerful groups, the politics of coalition, the capture of 
the definition of the situation and its imposition on others by a process 
of negotiation, and the like. In other words, conception and definition 
of a problem - and all subsequent steps necessary to arrive at a policy 
formulation - reflects what is politically feasable and workable. 
Here we will not follow the many steps that have to be developed before 
any concrete policy action can be started. The above analysis of the 
different notions of policy - without pretending to be complete - al-
ready reveals the long and complicated way to be covered from problem 
operationalisation to policy formulation. 
It will not change the crucial finding of our analysis: Between the 
results of new or already available scientific research and the genera-
tion and formulation of policy measures always lies a political decision, 
or rather a series of intervening political decisions. As Etzioni (1968: 
303) puts it: a societal decision-maker may choose to ignore facts, but 
- by definition - he cannot ignore power. The argument advanced here is 
of an elementary nature: sociological research findings and their rele-
vancy for policy formulation are always subject to political definitions, 
which in a pluralistic setting is a give-and-take process. It belongs to 
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the policy-making process as such; it is part and parcel of it. 
One can also put it the other way around: in the policy-making process, 
sociological research itself becomes a political resource, one amongst 
many other inputs. This is so because of the very act of transferring 
scientific procedures to the real-life situations of practical policy 
A lot of literature on the utilization of knowledge for public 
purposes suffers from underexposure of the dimension of power. Re-
search-based findings, if they do not take into account the existing 
relations of power and cooperation, will remain ineffective. 
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intervention in a societal context. Most of the time, social scientists 
provide a posteriori insights, which leaves the future wide open if one 
sticks to a voluntaristic perspective, the heart of policy-making. But 
even if a social scientist is more predictive, he will have to model 
his "recommendations" in ceteris-paribus terms, which is only one path 
in the daily jungle of policy-making. 
This feature of knowledge is an element of the nature of the science 
production system itself. But the impact of scientific knowledge in the 
political arena does not depend exclusively on the intrinsic qualities 
of science. The effectiveness of knowledge is determined not only by the 
strength of its evidence but also by the relative prestige positions of 
the disciplinary fields involved, the resources the social scientist can 
mobilize, the adviser's position relative to the acknowledged knowledge-
producing units, the weight of the communication network of the social 
scientist involved and so on. 
It is these considerations that make many a study about the impact of 
policy-oriented research in the social sciences so disappointing (for 
instance. Van de Vail, 1980). The receptiveness of policy-making bodies 
to sociological knowledge is much more determined by the terms of the 
relationship between the researchers and the other parties involved in 
a policy decision, rather than by "paradigms" and other intrinsic quali-
ties of the social research process. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
The foregoing analysis may be helpful in understanding the actual lack 
of utilization of social science knowledge in public policies. At the 
same time, the analysis adds to our understanding that this state of 
affairs is not of a temporary, passing nature that only requires more 
intensive and serious efforts on the part of the social sciences towards 
rationalizing the policy-making process and environment as many a socio-
logist might think. It is essential in the relations between social 
science and policy. There is no way out. 
The tenor of this analysis is not to be interpreted in the sense that 
social science research oriented towards policy issues is a useless 
undertaking, a view that would only lead to ruthless pessimism. My ar-
gument is not to be interpreted as a plea for ad-hoc policies. In this 
respect I do not endorse Lindblom's position, who makes his incrementa-
list approach not merely as the more realistic one, but also as the 
right and best strategy towards solving policy problems as they arise. 
The value of our analysis has to be found in a sharper delineation of 
the problematic relationship between social science and public policy 
than is generally pursued, in order to be able to define the limits of 
the capacity of penetration of social science knowledge. After this 
delineation, the argument is more open - within the essential limita-
tions of its potential impact - to reconsider the possibilities of im-
proving policy-oriented social science research. The line is drawn, but 
it remains a main responsibility for sociology to increase, if not the 
acceptability, the accessibility of public policy in context and conse-
quences for rational discussion that leads to conscious committent (see 
Van Lier, 1980:19). Or, as Etzioni (1968:300) states, the mixed-scanning 
strategy "generates demands for some scanning of the unfamiliar and for 
occasional reviews of alternatives excluded by the prevailing community-
of-assumptions and refuses to sanction adjustment of the ends to the 
means". 
This attitude, however, demands a lot of imagination and scrutiny on the 
part of the sociologist, as much in his capacity as a speaking citizen 
as a social researcher. Moreover, our analysis has shown that informa-
tion on a scientific basis may reduce uncertainties concerning specific 
aspects of a decisional situation, while adding to the same process of 
decision-making. 
Finally, the argument needs two more brief clarifications that if ela-
borated may cast new light on the interconnection of social science 
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knowledge in public policy. 
The first clarification refers to the suggestion contained in our anal-
ysis so far that public policies mainly and ultimately are to be con-
sidered as a product of the political configurations to date. A major 
challenge to this view, however, is that government policies are only 
slightly determined by partisan politics in accordance with Lindblom's 
term, but probably as much or even more by the prevailing socio-economic 
factors (Aquina, 1978). These small margins of public policy refer to 
the almost philosophical question of planned versus unplanned change and 
the limits of human intervention in societal processes. 
The notion of utilization is a second aspect that needs clarification. 
Generally, utilization of social science knowledge is seen by many a 
sociologist as the direct evidence of use in actual policy-making. 
However, if one looks at relevance in terms of policy courses of action 
under the decisive impact of political configurations, then the deliber-
ate neglect or bypassing of available scientific research findings for 
political, or any other reasons is equally part of the receptiveness 
complex as is direct utilization. Not using information, not seeing the 
relevance of available knowledge, the imposition of ignorance on others 
and so on is as vital a part of the decision-making process as is 
"normal" utilization. Non-utilization is not to be interpreted as re-
sistance to innovations or recommendations only, but as part of the 
whole system of knowledge processing. 
Unfortunately, most sociologists withdraw from the scene the moment they 
have presented their findings and recommendations, if any. The transfor-
mation of their work into a political resource does not, as a rule, form 
part of the direct experiences of the social scientist. The sociologist 
who sees himself as a "problem solver" might have a distorted image of 
his position, and consequently of his potential contribution. In the 
same vein, the concept of social engineering might be misleading. 
After so many ill-fated social research programmes that were supposed to 
be policy-relevant, the need for applied sociology as such is to be 
questioned. More theory-oriented research is needed as well about the 
transformation conditions and tranformation processes of social know-
ledge into policy-making. This essay is meant to be a contribution to 
this awareness, in accordance with Kurt Lewin's admonition that nothing 
is as practical as a good theory. 
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